In 1996, Germany introduced the Altersteilzeit (ATZ) law, which encouraged longer working lives through partial retirement incentives. Using matched pension system and establishment survey data, we estimate changes in part-time employment and retirement after ATZ. We find the policy induced growth in part-time work for men and extended men's expected duration of employment by 1.8 years.
Introduction
Population aging has important economic consequences. From 1992 to 2002, the share of older workers in the U.S. labor force increased from 12% to 14% and is expected to reach 26% by 2022 (Toossi 2013) . In European countries the situation is more critical because birth rates are among the lowest in the world, life expectancies are among the highest, and trends towards earlier retirement and longer life expectancies exacerbate the demographic transition ("Pensions at a Glance 2013: OECD and G20 Indicators" 2013) . From 1965 to 1995, average retirement age for men fell by 4.4 years in Germany as compared to 1.9 years in the U.S. (Gendell 1998 ).
The aging workforce raises concerns about the solvency of public pension systems and creates a need to explore policy options that may extend working life.
Finding cost effective ways to incentivize longer working lives among older workers is one way to ease current demographic pressures (Maestas and Zissimopoulos 2010) .To encourage later transitions out of working life, some countries have created incentives for partial retirement with the aim of postponing full retirement. Recently, average effective retirement ages have risen in many European countries and partial retirement may have played an important role in enabling longer work lives (Comeau and Latulippe 2015) . Yet, these policies may instead crowd out years that would have been spent in full time employment, without postponing retirement (Gustman and Steinmeier 2008) . To date seven European countries have enacted partial retirement policies, but there are few rigorous empirical studies of their effects (Eurofound 2014) .
1 In this paper we investigate Germany's partial retirement policy.
Studying German policies, as we do here, is especially important because
Germany is "the first and biggest test" of the effects of population aging (Elliot and Kollewe 2011 ). Germany's population aged 15 to 64 is projected to fall 23 percent by 2050, compared to an overall population decline of 13 percent (Fuchs, Söhnlein, and Weber 2008 ). Germany's demographic challenges have been featured in the U.S. media because the U.S. is projected to face similar challenges in the future (Daley and Kulish 2013) . In addition, as the largest economy in Europe, Germany's continued economic success is critical to Europe and the global economy.
We examine changes in part-time employment and retirement associated with incentives for partial retirement introduced in Germany through the 1996
Altersteilzeit (ATZ) policy. ATZ set compensation floors for partial retirees, aged 55 and older, and provided subsidies to employers if they replaced partial retirees' work hours by hiring unemployed workers or trainees. Our information comes from a particularly rich source of matched employer-employee administrative data: the Linked Employer Employee Data of the Institute for Employment
Research (LIAB). The LIAB offers the unique advantage of matching survey data from a national stratified random sample of German establishments to social security records for all establishment employees covered by the social security system. We estimate changes in part-time employment and retirement hazard rates in a difference-in-differences framework using before and after policy variation and exploiting the age cutoff of 55.
The estimates suggest that the ATZ policy was initially successful, especially for men. It was associated with large increases in part-time employment among 55-61 year old males, with a peak increase of 20 percentage points at age 61. Since this growth largely occurred among persons who would have otherwise been retired, male worklives were extended by 1.8 years, and fulltime employment by 0.8 years. In combination, these results indicate that the 5 policy significantly increased working time among 55 to 65 year old men.
Conversely, there were no important changes in worklife duration among women.
However, as the ATZ policy evolved, many men and women were able to use an increasingly expansive definition of partial retirement to achieve earlier abrupt departures from work while technically remaining employed, as described below.
Once these opportunities became popular, the average worklife extension of males fell to a (still substantial) 1.2 years, but females worked 0.2 fewer years, and full-time 1.2 years less than before the ATZ policy was implemented. These disparate results point to the importance of careful policy design which focuses on the incentives inherent in specific aspects of the programs implemented.
The ATZ Policy
Early retirement was very common in Germany in the early 1990s.
Between 1993 and 1995, approximately 25% of men left the labor force by age 56
between 1993 and 1995 (Borsch-Supan and Schnabel 1997 . A common path for these retirements involved an abrupt transition from full-time work to retirement, supported through the unemployment insurance system, and then followed by the claiming of Old Age pensions. In the 1990s, Germany (as well as many other developed countries) addressed the unsustainable early retirement patterns by raising pensionable ages and reducing access to unemployment insurance.
Germany also introduced incentives for gradual, later, transitions from working life to retirement through the ATZ policy.
ATZ had three goals. First, it was intended to promote gradual transitions between work and retirement. The second was to extend working lives by offering an alternative to abrupt (early) retirement. Third, it was intended to encourage the employment of unemployed workers and trainees as older persons retired. We examine the extent to which the ATZ achieved the first two of these objectives.
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To accomplish these goals, the law set compensation and pension contribution floors for partial retirees, aged 55 and older, who reduced work hours by 50% over a 3 to 10 year period and had worked at least 1,080 days in the previous 5 years in jobs covered by the social security system (though not necessarily all with the same employer). Specifically, ATZ required partial retirees be paid at minimum 70% of prior (pre-partial retirement) earnings and pension benefits accrue at a minimum of 90% of the rate obtained under full-time work. Also, wage earnings in excess of 50% of prior earnings were exempt from income taxes. ATZ participants were eligible for full Old Age Pension benefits at age 60.
2 While this seems too early to promote extensions of working lives in the current German context, the modal retirement age in Germany when the ATZ was introduced was 58.
Finally, ATZ made federal subsidies available to help employers meet the new compensation floors. These subsidies were equivalent to 20% of former fulltime wages and 40% of full-time pension contributions, but were only paid if employers replaced partial retirees' hours by hiring an unemployed worker or trainee. In practice, few employers applied for subsidies and anecdotal evidence suggests that employers offered ATZ opportunities without subsidization because it was a legal way to reduce workforce and manage demographic transition (Schmähl 2003) .
The effects of ATZ were not immediate because the policy required employers and employees to establish agreements that outline the terms for partial retirement arrangements, usually as part of a collective agreement. Collective bargaining in Germany generally takes place regionally at the industry level and approximately 58% of the workforce is covered by collective agreements (Peter
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Ellguth and Kohaut 2015). In many industries, the pay and pension contributions negotiated exceeded the ATZ minimums.
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Six other European countries have laws similar to Germany's ATZ, and three others have institutionalized corresponding incentives through the collective bargaining system (Eurofound 2014) . Existing studies suggest the effects of partial retirement policies on part-time employment vary from country to country.
Some previous investigations of Germany's law found little or no effect on parttime work because the number of subsidies paid to employers was quite low (Trampusch 2005) . Yet, other studies indicate the majority of partial retirements
were not subsidized , and so are not captured by looking only at subsidy payments (Brussig, Knuth, and Wojtkowski 2009) . Using German data , Wanger (2010) reports approximately 16% of all newly retired individuals were ATZ participants. Huber, Lechner, and Wunsch (2013) estimate workers ages 51 to 60 in firms that offered partial retirement opportunities spent an average of 6 to 9 months more in part-time employment than those in firms that did not.
Policies permitting work hours reductions to be made across months or years (like Germany's did) were more popular than those requiring decreases on a daily or weekly basis (Latulippe and Turner 2000) . However, such flexible policies also created a loophole leading to de facto early retirement arrangements that qualified for partial retirement incentives. For example, an employee who continued to work full-time for 1.5 years and not at all for the next 1.5 years would meet the ATZ requirement of a 50% reduction in working time over a minimum of 3 years. In Germany these were known as Block Model arrangements. Critics argued that the use of ATZ for Block Model arrangements subsidized early abrupt transitions from work rather than encouraging gradual 8 later retirements as desired, but to our knowledge there has been no formal empirical evaluation of these claims (Schmähl 2003) .
Previous studies provide conflicting evidence about whether partial retirement incentives extend working life. Sunden (1994) and Wadensjö (2006) concluded that Sweden's program led to a net increase in labor supply among older workers. Conversely, Graf, Hofer, and Winter-Ebmer (2011) Approximately 80% of the German workforce is subject to social security; excluded categories include civil servants, family workers, and marginal workers. 7 The data span 1993 through 2010. Employed individuals in sampled establishments and job seekers are included in the data; retirees are not.
The establishment sample is designed to be representative of the German economy in each year within establishment size (employment), industry, and the state (Bundesland) strata. The data contain survey responses from 4,000 to 14,000 establishments per year linked to employment spell data for between 1.6 and 2.6 million individuals.
5 Detailed information about the LIAB cross sectional model and associated data sets is available in (Heining, Scholz, and Seth 2013) . 6 Other linkages are available but this "cross sectional model" is based on a stratified random sample of surveyed establishments and was chosen for this study to produce representative estimates of the policy. 7 Marginal workers are persons with temporary employment contracts whose earnings through the marginal employment job fall below legislated thresholds. They are exempt from many of the employment protection and mandated benefits policies in Germany. The LIAB is organized as spell data. 9 We retain all spells of employment and partial retirement for workers ages 50 to 65 and convert the data to a panel of person-year observations. In doing so, we lose some information about the specific timing of retirements, but this is necessary because employers only report work schedule information on the annual notification, as detailed below. In cases where an employee is employed in more than one establishment in the same year, we include information from the longest spell only. 10 With these restrictions, our analytic sample contains 3,643,954 person-year observations of men and 1,920,232 of women.
Analytic Sample

Construction of Dependent Variables
We focus on two binary dependent variables: part-time employment and retirement. These measures are created from the notifications employers are statutorily required to provide to the social security system. Employers report part-time work on an annual basis. They do not provide precise work hours, but rather indicate: a schedule that is less than usual full-time hours but is at least 50% of them; or a schedule that is less than 50% of usual full-time hours. Our measure of part-time employment is equal to zero in all years employees are reported as working full-time and one when working either of these part-time schedules. We do not distinguish between the two part-time schedules because ATZ allowed for a wide variety of work arrangements. Restricting focus to arrangements where employees work less than 50% of weekly full-time hours might exclude some portions of partial retirement spells and obscure the timing of policy responses. It is also worth noting that Block Model participants are always coded as zero, for this variable, because they never reduce work hours.
Retirement is defined using the notifications employers are required to file at the end of an employment relationship. We construct a variable equal to zero in all calendar years until an end of employment notification is filed and one in the year it is filed. Because individuals are only included in the LIAB while employed in sampled establishments, they are no longer in the data after this point unless they happen to be re-employed in another sampled establishment. Thus, end of employment need not coincide with Old Age Pension claiming, since some individuals could take a new job in an establishment outside of the sample or postpone pension claiming. This is unlikely to be a major concern. Although the data do not contain information on pension benefit receipt; in our analytic sample, observations of workers in their first year of employment with an establishment 12 constitute only 2% of person-year observations among individuals 50 and above, suggesting that few older persons start new employment (rather than retiring)
after ending a job.
Block Model participants are classified as employed during the Release Phase, even though they are no longer working. Our retirement measure is equal to zero until the last year of the Release Phase to reflect the continuation of the employment relationship. However, as explained below, we also adjust simulated survival rates to produce survival functions that exclude Block Model Release
Phase participants, so as to differentiate between end of employment and end of work.
Construction of the ATZ Policy Variable
Although the ATZ was introduced in 1996, and the compensation floors took effect then, participation was very low until 1999. Table 1 reports the month and year clauses were introduced into the collective bargaining contracts of selected major industries.
Appendix Table A2 provides the same information for a broader group of industries, along with details about the terms negotiated. Our analysis of collective bargaining agreements revealed that several industries negotiated compensation above the ATZ floors, which explains why the ratio of part-time wages to prior full-time wages in Figure 1 exceeds the federally required 0.7. We also test the robustness of our findings to excluding years 1996 through 1998 from the analysis, but given the pre-trends in part-time employment displayed in Figure 2 our preferred specification includes these years in the pre-ATZ period.
Empirical Strategy
We estimate employment effects of the ATZ policy using a differencein-differences framework. Specifically, our control group consists of 50-54 year olds, who are not directly affected by the program, while 55-65 year olds are the treatment group. We compare changes in part-time work and retirement rates for the baseline (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) and two post-policy (1991-2001 and 2002-2004) periods. As mentioned, effects in the two post-implementation periods could differ because Block Model arrangements were rare in the earlier one but more widely available subsequently.
Effects of the ATZ policy may differ by age. The policy permitted partial retirements as brief as 3 or as long as 10 years, and allowed persons ending partial retirement spells to claim full old-age pension benefits at age 60.
Therefore, the greatest incentives for part-time employment might occur at or near age 57 (three years prior to age 60). However, establishments were permitted to cap the share of the workforce that could be partially retired. If these opportunities were provided based on worker seniority, some workers might first qualify at ages above 57 and they might then delay retirement past 60.
We allow effects of the ATZ to vary flexibly with age by interacting the policy treatment-effects with individual age dummy variables, so that our differences-in-differences estimation equation is: We stratify our estimates by gender, reflecting the very different rates of part-time employment prior to ATZ: only 1% of men in our sample were working part-time in 1993-1998 as compared to 31% of women. Pensionable ages also differ for men and women during the study period and the attractiveness of ATZ arrangements may depend on one's opportunities for abrupt retirement.
Additionally, employment across industries differs by gender. ATZ was primarily implemented through the collective bargaining process which, in Germany, generally produces industry level agreements. Many of the earliest partial retirement clauses were enacted in male dominated industries (see Table 1 ). 
Simulated Employment Survival Rates and Durations
We simulated the effects of ATZ on duration of working lives as follows.
First, we take the vector of actual hazard rates in 1993-98 at ages 55 to 65 and calculate the baseline survival function as:
where Sj0 and hj0 are baseline employment survival and hazard rates at age j. Next, we compute hazard rates in the two post-policy periods by adding to the baseline hazard rates the regression-adjusted estimates of the change at each age and postpolicy period attributable to ATZ:
where p refers to the post-AZT period and Δℎ is the estimated change in the hazard rate. Survival rates are then calculated analogously to equation [2] and the computed survival rates are used to estimate changes in the duration of employment, Dp, relative to the pre-ATZ period as:
where Sjp is the computed survival rate at age j for time period p, one of the two post-ATZ time periods (1999-2001 or 2002-2004) and Sj0 is the corresponding survival rate during the pre-policy period (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) .
To compute full-time employment survival functions and changes in the duration of full-time work we use actual pre-ATZ part-time employment rates at each age in 1993-1998, and add to them the vector of estimated changes attributable to ATZ in each post policy period to compute part-time employment rates:
We then subtract the vectors of part-time employment rates in each period from the computed survival rates to obtain the full-time employment survival rates, Fj, Changes in the duration of full-time work, Wp, are computed as: 
Descriptive Statistics
Econometric Results
For brevity and ease of interpretation, we present most key econometric results graphically. However, Appendix Section A3 provides all information in the graphs in tabular form, as well as regression coefficients for the supplementary covariates. were similar in the pre-and post-ATZ periods -the estimated differences are all smaller than 0.1 percentage point although, given our large sample sizes, still statistically significant -implying that there were no important changes in parttime employment patterns among younger men, and that the estimated increases at age 55 and above are likely attributable to the policy. Conversely, part-time employment did increase among younger women, raising the possibility that some of the growth observed after age 55 higher ages might be attributable to secular trends, rather than the ATZ. This further supports the conclusion that men's parttime employment rates increased more than women's. It is interesting that part-time employment rates do not peak until close to or even after age 60 for both men and women, given that partial retirees could retire with full pension benefits at age 60. A potential explanation is that some individuals may not have begun partial retirement in time to complete the minimum three year spell by age 60. This could reflect poor planning on their part. However, an alternative explanation is employer rationing of partial retirement arrangements, which seems plausible since many collective bargaining agreements contained explicit caps on partial retirement participation of 3% to 8% of the workforce (Eurofound 2014).
Part-Time Employment
Retirement
The ATZ-induced increases in part-time employment identified above reflect some combination of reductions in full-time work and increases in parttime job-holding among persons who would otherwise have been retired. Here, we examine the latter, Figures 4A and 4B show the estimated changes in agespecific annual retirement hazard rates and reveal striking differences by gender.
Among men, the estimates imply a discrete drop in retirement likelihood between age 55 and 59 in both post-policy periods. Although part-time employment rates remained high after age 60, the retirement hazard rates are not statistically significantly different from pre-ATZ levels at ages 60 or 61. So, it appears any delay in retirement attributable to ATZ occurred before age 60. For women, we find little evidence of a change in retirement behavior prior to age 60 in either 20 post-ATZ period. Interestingly, fewer women retired at age 60 in the post-policy periods but more retired at age 61.
To more directly assess how ATZ may have changed the expected duration of working life, Figures 5A and 5B plot the simulated employment survival rates computed from our hazard rate models using Equation implies lower employment survival rates in these years than before the policy.
To further interpret these patterns, Table 3 reports changes in expected employment durations implied by the simulated survival rates, computed using To summarize, the ATZ policy appears to have extended the worklives of men and women and led to a net increase in hours before the Block Model became popular, though this increase was markedly larger among men than women. When the Block Model option became available, women used it to stop working earlier than they otherwise would have, while men continued to work longer than prior to implementation of the ATZ, but less so than when the Block Model had been unavailable.
Robustness Checks
We also tested how the ATZ affected durations of employment and work using a variety of alternative specifications. The results are summarized in columns (2) through (6) of Table 3 . In column (2) controls for individual wage 22 and occupation were included as supplementary controls. 14 Second, we excluded the period between the passage of ATZ and effective date (1996 to 1998). Third, we restricted the analysis to a subset of industries for which we were able to obtain information about collective bargaining agreements. For this subsample, we use the dates when partial retirement clauses were introduced to define the pre and post policy periods. Fourth, we restricted the sample to persons employed within the establishment since age 50, in order to limit potential selection into (or out of) establishments. Fifth, we added establishment fixed effects to the baseline model.
Across these alternative specifications, we consistently find evidence of longer employment durations among men. In all but one specification (with controls for wage and occupation included), we also find that ATZ led to a net increase in male lifetime work hours in both post policy periods. The magnitude of the estimated durations change substantially when omitting 1996 to 1998 from the sample or using collective bargaining agreement dates, but all other estimates of employment duration remain reasonably close to the baseline estimates.
Conversely, the results are much less robust to changes of model specifications for women, but all of the estimates indicate earlier departures from the labor force once the Block Model became available.
Discussion and Conclusion
This paper investigates whether incentives for partial-retirement introduced through Germany's federal ATZ policy successfully promoted gradual transitions to retirement and longer working lives. Among men, our findings suggest the policy did work as designed. ATZ was associated with substantial increases in part-time work and reductions in retirement hazard rates that translated into a 1.8 year extension in the expected duration of employment.
When the Block Model option, which amounts to a form of early retirement, became available, the ATZ-induced extension of average male working lives fell to around 1.2 years because many men remained employed but did not work during the Block Model Release Phase. Nevertheless, even in this period, our analysis suggests that the ATZ led to a net increase in lifetime hours of work among men.
For women, the results are more difficult to interpret. We do find increases in part-time work among older women but cannot be sure they are attributable to the ATZ policy, because part-time employment also increased for those too young . 15 In our data the average duration of partial retirement was 3 years, which implies the total subsidy cost for a subsidized arrangement would be €38,724. Prior studies estimate between 10 and 20 percent of ATZ arrangements were subsidized, depending on the year (Brussig, Knuth, and Wojtkowski 2009) . Assuming 20 percent were subsidized, the expected total subsidy cost per partial retiree would be approximately €7,745.
15 Average earnings figure is from OECD (2004). Subsidies provided 20% of former full-time earnings and 40% of former pension contributions. 20% of average earnings is €7,620. Assumed pension contribution rate is 35.7% based on Boss and Elander (2005) , so the pension contribution subsidy amount is €5,288. These figures also correspond with the annual cost per subsidized participant implied by administrative data from the Federal Employment Agency reported in Huber, Lechner, and Wunsch (2013) .
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The simulated employment and full-time work durations, from our preferred specification for the low Block Model period (1999) (2000) (2001) , imply a net gain in income tax revenue among men of approximately €7,500 per male partial retiree and €160 per female. 16 Previous studies indicate 56% of partial retirees were male, so the average gain in tax revenue is approximately €4,270 per partial retiree (Huber, Lechner, and Wunsch 2013) . Using simulated durations from the Notably, the savings in unemployment insurance benefits is responsible for the large estimated gains in both periods. In environments with less generous unemployment benefits, or where workers were not originally financing early retirements with public benefits, the savings from partial retirement may be much smaller or even negative. Also, if all partial retirees had been subsidized the policy may have led to a net loss. However, the subsidies were contingent upon the employment of an unemployed worker or trainee to fill the reduced hours, and our calculations do not account for unemployment benefit savings or additional tax revenue associated with hiring these workers.
The extensions in employed life attributable to ATZ, among men, appear large when compared to the corresponding effects from increasing the normal retirement age, another common policy for extending worklives. For example, Gustman and Steinmeier (1985) estimate the percentage of the labor force retiring at age 65 will fall by 6.3 percentage points when the increase in normal U.S. Notes: Dependent variable is equal to 0 for all full-time employed persons and 1 for part-time employed persons. All regressions include year, industry, and German state dummies. Estimates are means of marginal effects computed after Probit estimation and interpreted as changes in the probability of part-time employment expressed as a decimal. These regressions are the source of changes in age specific part-time employment rates plotted in Figures 3A and 3B , too.
Source: Author calculations. Linked Employer-Employee Data of IAB (LIAB).
a Age of eligibility for full benefits from old age pension remained constant at 65 for all men during this time period. See Appendix Section A1 for detailed explanation of changes in pensionable age that occurred during study period. *** Significant at the 1 percent level.
** Significant at the 5 percent level. * Significant at the 10 percent level. Notes: Dependent variable is equal to 0 for all persons still employed at all (including Block Model participants) until the last year of employment when dependent variable equals 1. Last year of employment is only counted if an end of employment notification is filed. All regressions include year, industry, and German state dummies. Estimates are means of marginal effects computed after Probit estimation and interpreted as changes in the retirement (defined as end of the employment relationship) hazard rate. These regressions are the source of changes in age specific retirement hazard rates plotted in Figures 4A and 4B , too.
** Significant at the 5 percent level. * Significant at the 10 percent level. [1993] [1994] [1995] [1996] [1997] [1998] computed from LIAB data and estimated changes in hazard rates associated with ATZ policy. Survival rates computed from hazard rates for individuals employed at age 50.
